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ARGUMENT
I

BECAUSE JOEL FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT FRED, AS
TITLE HOLDER, OWNED THE RANCH PROPERTY, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED TEAT THE RANCH PROPERTY WAS A
PARTNERSHIP ASSET.
Joel argues that, because a partnership agreement to hold

land as a partnership asset need not be in writing, the trial
court properly determined that the ranch was a partnership asset.
(Joel's Brief at 26. J1

As described below, however, Joel failed

to rebut the presumption that Fred, as the holder of title to the
property, owned the property at his death.
A.

.Tnp-L Fail*"* «•" Rebvf the Presumption that Fred, as
TiMsholder, Owned <-** Property.

Under the general rule in the jurisdictions, Fred's holding
of title to the ranch property created a presumption that Fred
owned the property.
Bramberg

and Ribstein

See Alan R. Bramberg & Larry E. Ribstein, 1
on Partnership,

§ 3.02(d) (3), at 3:20

(Supp. 1998); 59 Am. Jur.2d Partnership

§ 373 (1987).

Although

the presumption of individual ownership may be rebutted by a
clear showing of the parties' intent to include the property as a
partnership asset, "this intent must include the intent of the
titleholder of the property involved."

1

Mischke

v. Mischke,

The opening brief of the Appellants/Daughters will be
referred to as the "Daughters' Brief."

530

N.W.2d 235, 240 (Neb. 1995).

"Use of the property alone is not

sufficient because an owner may intend to contribute only the
use, as distinguished from the ownership, to the partnership."
Id.

Here, Fred's actions during his lifetime do not reflect his
intent that the ranch property belong to the partnership.

Only

Fred held title to the property and claimed deductions for
depreciation on the property.
pg. 42.)

(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27; R. 282,

Fred, his estate, or his heirs have paid all property

taxes, which totaled over $20,000.

(Id.

at 38, 139, 179, 194.)

Although Fred's affidavit stated that a partnership was buying
the property, the affidavit was required under federal law to
complete the purchase of the land.

(Id.

at 92-93; Plaintiffs'

Exhibit 3 0.)
Joel argues that he and Fred's "business decision" to title
the property in Fred's name did not alter their intent to include
the ranch property as a partnership asset.

(Joel's Brief at 31.)

Joel testified that Fred decided to put the ranch in Fred's name
to protect the property against creditors in case Joel got into
trouble.

(R. 282, pgs. 93-94.)

Fred's decision to hold title

individually for creditor protection, however, suggests that: he

2

intended to own the land himself and merely allow the partnership
to use the land for cattle ranching.

Indeed, Fred's actions

compel the same conclusion reached in Mischke:

the partnership

between Joel and Fred merely enjoyed the use, rather than the
ownership, of the ranch property.

See 530 N.W.2d at 240. The

evidence of Fred's alleged intent that the partnership own the
property is not sufficiently clear to rebut the legal presumption
that Fred, as the titleholder, owned the property.
Pendleton v. Strange,

See

381 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).

Thus, this Court should reject the trial court's conclusion that
the property is a partnership asset, and reverse the judgment of
the trial court.
B

See Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-5 (1998) .

T^ ^* Event «-^g Court Reverses the Trial Court's
.•mxrrrn^* that tho V^rh P-nDertv is a Partnership
Aflfiftfc. tb-J° Pnurt S*»»-M Rg-iect Joel's Request ror
T?Pveraa3 ^ fhe J^ CTflnt Regarding the Corner Parcel.

Joel argues that, if this Court reverses the trial court's
judgment regarding ownership of the property, this Court should
also "reverse the trial court's determination that the corner
parcel . . . was partnership property."

(Joel's Brief at 32.)

This Court, however, will not reverse "on errors claimed for the
first time on appeal."

Limb v. Federated Milk

461 P.2d 290, 293 n.2 (Utah 1969).

Producers

Ass'n,

At trial, Joel testified that

if a partnership did not exist, then he was entitled to the
comer property.2

(R. 282, pg. 65.) Joel maintained at trial

that he "purchased the [corner] property with his own funds and
intended it to be a part of his contribution to a land-and-cattle
partnership."

(Joel's Brief at 32.)

Thus, because Joel's

argument regarding the corner parcel was not preserved below,
this Court should refuse to address it. See

id.

In any event, even assuming that Joel preserved the issue
below, reversal of the trial court's judgment regarding the
corner parcel would require a cross-appeal of that issue. Joel's
cross-appeal, however, is limited to the issue of labor as a
capital contribution.

In State

v. South,

924 P.2d 354 (Utah

1996) , the supreme court established that it is the "result" or
"outcome" of a trial court's judgment or decision that requires a
cross-appeal.

Id.

at 357.

In this case, reversal of the trial court's judgment
regarding the corner property would change the ultimate outcome

2

Joel argues, without citation to the record, that the
trial court's decision regarding the corner parcel was premised
on its finding that the ranch property was a partnership asset.
(Joel's Brief at 13 n. 3.) To the contrary, the trial court ruled
that "[t]he testimony was that [the corner parcel] was part of
the partnership. He was purchasing it for the partnership." (R.
282, pg. 209.)
4

or result of the court's decision:

the corner parcel would no

longer be deemed a partnership asset.

The effect of this Court's

reversal on ownership of the corner property would be to enlarge
Joel's rights and lessen the Daughters' rights. That result
requires a cross-appeal of the issue.

See id.

at 355-56. Thus,

in the event this Court reverses the trial court's judgment
regarding the ranch property, it should reject Joel's invitation
to consider issues related to the corner property because those
issues are not properly before this Court on appeal.
II

BECAUSE JOEL FAILED TO PRESENT CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
THAT FR'D T E N D E D TO GIVE AND IRREVOCABLY DELIVERED TO JOEL
ON^" HALF 0' ETS CAPITAL CONTRIBUTION, THIS COURT SEOULD
REVERSE TEE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT REGARDING THE GIFT.
Joel argues that clear and convincing evidence supports the

trial court's determination that Fred made a legal gift to Joel
of one half of his capital contribution.
35.)
Co.,

Joel quotes portions of Lovezz

(Joel's Erief at 34-

v. Continental

Bank & Trust

4 Utah 2d 76, 286 P.2d 1065 (1955), arguing that "'it rests

primarily with the trial court to determine whether the evidence
is clear and convincing."'

Id.

at 1068 (citation omitted).

The

remainder of the quoted statement, however, emphasizes that the
trial court's ''finding is not necessarily conclusive."
The Lcvetz

Id.

court discussed at length the heightened standard

governing appellate review of the trial court's determination of
whether "clear and convincing" evidence was presented at trial:
11 ?

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding should

be considered by the appellate court in the light of [the "clear
and convincing" evidence standard].'"

id.

(citation omitted).

The court stated that "where a higher degree of evidence is
required to establish a fact a proportionately greater degree of
proof is required to sustain a finding of the existence of such
fact."

id.

Regarding the quantum of proof necessary to meet the

standard, the supreme court stated that "clear and convincing
evidence" approaches the criminal standard of "proof beyond a
reasonable doubt."3

Id.

at 1067; see

also

Jardine

v.

Archibald,

3 Utah 2d 88, 279 P.2d 454, 457 (1955) ("'Clear and convincing
evidence clinches what might be otherwise only probable to the
mind.'" (citation omitted)).

In view of the Lovett standard of

appellate review, this Court will not, as in the typical case,
affirm the judgment if any evidence exists to support the trial

3

Joel suggests that, under Lovett,
undisputed collateral
evidence is sufficient to support a finding of an inter vivos
gift. (Joel's Brief at 34.) Lovett, however, does not support
that assertion. In its decision, the Lovett court relied in part
on direct evidence in the form of statements made by the decedent
clearly expressing donative intent. See 286 P. 2d at 1068.
6

court's judgment.

Rather, "[i]t requires a higher degree cf

proof to sustain a finding of fact which must be established by
'clear and convincing evidence' . . . than where mere proof by a
preponderance of the evidence is sufficient."

Lovett, 286 P.2d

at 1067.
A.

The Evidence Before the Trial Court Does Not "Clinch"
the Finding that Fred Intended to Give to Joel One Half
of His Capital Contribution,

Joel correctly notes that, to find an inter vivos gifc, the
trial court must find the following elements by clear and
convincing evidence: donative intent, irrevocable delivery, and
accepcance.

(Joel's Brief at 35.)

The burden of persuasion on

these elements rests with Joel, "as the claiming donee."
George,

Sims

v.

466 P.2d 831, 933 (Utah 1970) . The courts recognize a

clear distinction between the lay definition of a "gift" and the
legal standard for finding a valid gift inter vivos.
First

Gibraltar

Bank,

FSB San Antonio,

See

Scto

v.

868 S.W.2d 400, 403-04

(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that, although the alleged doners
believed, in lay terms, that a valid gift had been mace, the gift
was legally insufficient because the donors retained the right to
revoke the gift).
Citing West

v.

Nest,

16 Utah 2d 411, 403 P.2d 22 (1963),

7

Joel argues that his family relationship with Fred is a
"significant" factor in determining the validity of the gift.
(Joel's Brief at 35.)

West,

however, states only that a trial

court may place "some reliance on the fact that it is natural to
make a gift to a member of one's family."
added).

id.

at 25 (emphasis

Standing alone, the family relationship is insufficient.

Joel goes on to highlight the trial court's finding that Fred and
Joel developed a close relationship, while "Fred's relationship
with his heirs was estranged and lacked any contact."4
Brief at 36.)

(Joel's

Joel himself, however, testified that Fred's

relationship with his children had nothing to do with this case.
(R. 282, pgs. 58-59.)
Citing Sims,

Joel further points to Fred and Joel's

friendship as evidence supporting a gift.

In Sims,

however, the

donor had written a note expressly stating his delivery of
certain shares of stock as a gift.

466 P.2d at 832. The supreme

court noted that the friendship existing between the donor and

Joel also points to the trial court's references regarding
his credibility as a witness at trial. (Joel's Brief at 35.)
Although Joel correctly notes that credibility is a determination
for the trial court, even taking Joel's testimony at face value
fails to establish the necessary- evidence to support che trial
court's "gift" determination.
8

donee was consistent with the jury's finding of a gift.

Id.

Joel relies heavily on evidence before the trial court
supporting Joel f s assertion that Fred contributed money to the
cattle business in an efforc to help Joel in his future career.
(Joel's Brief at 37-38.)

Even assuming, however, that Fred's

primary motivation for entering into the cattle operation was to
help Joel establish a career, an assumption not truly supported
by the evidence,5 that evidence merely reflects Fred's motivation
to contribute to the business.

Significantly, Joel testified as

follows regarding Fred's participation in the business: "If it
wasn't a good deal for Fred, do you think he would have did iu?
No.

It was a beneficial deal for both of us.

(Emphasis added.)

(R. 282, pg. 183.)

Fred's contribution of money to the business

to help Joel get started in his ranching career simply does not

5

Joel testified that Fred had told him "with your ycuth ana
my wisdom and age and cold hard cash on the corner of the casle,
there isn't nothing we can't do." (R. 282, pg. 148.) (Empnasis
added.) Fred also told Joel that they were "together" on
purchasing the property. (Id. at 35-36.) Significantly a: the
becinning of their business relationship when ooel uola rrsa the.
he^had boucht a cow, Fred's "eyes kind of lit up." (Id. a: 9.)
When Joel isked Fred if he wanted io "get into it" [tne
i Fred
TT-r-^ri saia
M I H "yeb
V P S." v-^-;
(Td.)
Their cattle business gave
business],
^ ^
Fred "somethina to wake up in the morning for. . . . r.e couia
think about things, plan things out. It gave him, you Knew,
thouchts again." (Id- at 183.)
9

"clinch" an otherwise "probable" finding that Fred intended to
make a legal gift to Joel of one half of his capital
contributions.

Jardine,

279 P. 2d at 457.6

Because the evidence

does not show that it is "highly probable" that Fred intended to
give one half of his contributions to Joel, the trial court erred
in its finding.
B.

Lovett, 286 P.2d at 1067.

Joel Failed to Meet His Burden to Establish that Fred
Irrevocably Parted With and Gave Up All Control Over
One Half of His Capital Contribution.

Joel contends that Fred's retention of one half of the
capital contributions distinguishes the facts of this case from
those cited in the Daughters' Brief.

(Joel's Brief at 3 8.)

Although the court found that Fred gave Joel only one half of his
capital contribution, (R. 255), Fred was still required to
irrevocably part with the portion given to Joel such that
delivery of the fifty-percent interest reached the "'point of no
return.'"

In re Lefrak,

215 B.R. 930, 934 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.)

(citation omitted) (stating that donor alleged to have given a
fifty-percent interest in certain real property was required to
"surrender dominion and control irrevocably to the donee"),

6

As noted in the Daughters' Brief, Fred did not file any
gift tax return. See Burnett
v. Burnett,
471 S.E.2d 649, 651
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that "whether a gift tax return was
filed" is "evidence relative to donative intent").
10

aff'd,

1998 WL 809527 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) . Indeed, the donee must

part with "present and future dominion and control over [the
gift] beyond any power on his part to recall."

Dial

v. Dial,

603

So. 2d 1020, 1023 (Ala. 1992) (emphasis added).
Fred's retention of title to the entire property does not
show an irrevocable delivery of one half of the property to Joel.
(R. 282, pg. 37.)

Fred did not claim deductions for depreciation

on only one half of the property or losses on feed; he claimed
deductions for the entire property and all losses.

(Jd. at 42;

Plaintiffs? Exhibit 17-13.)

Fred, his estate, or his heirs have

paid all the property taxes.

(R. 232, pgs. 38, 139, 179, 194.)

See Estate

of Kennedy v. May, 318 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (App. Div.

1971) (affirming finding of no gifc because alleged donor
"continued to pay taxes, insurance, maintenance and improvements
to the property").
Joel suggests, however, that Fred and Joel's "purposeful
business decisions" surrounding tide, tax returns, and property
taxes "dispel any inferences contrary" to a gifn.
at 39.)

(Joel's Brief

To the contrary, that the decisions were "business"

related dispels all inferences supporting the trial court's gift
determination.

Fred did not irrevocably deliver one half of his

11

contribution to Joel; he contributed the money to the cattle
business.

(See Daughters' Brief, at 28-31.)

The evidence does

not show that Joel could reasonably have taken "his" half of the
contribution and used it in any manner at his discretion, an
inference that must be supported by the evidence if Fred
irrevocably parted with all dominion over one half of the assets.
Indeed, Joel himself testified that he treated Fred's cash
contributions as "business" funds, carefully avoiding commingling
of business and personal funds in the Key Bank checking account.
(R. 282, pg. 45.)
At most, Joel presented some evidence consistent with the
trial court's finding of a gift.
Daughter's Brief at 27-28.)

(See Joel's Brief at 35-38;

Joel failed, however, to meet his

burden of persuasion in presenting clear and convincing evidence
of the elements of an inter vivos gift.
1067; Sims,

466 P.2d at 833.

See Lovett, 286 P. 2d at

For these reasons, this Court

should reverse the judgment of the trial court finding that Fred
made an inter vivos gift to Joel of one half of his capital
contributions.

12

III. BECAUSE THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT JOEL'S ASSERTED THEORIES
OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND IMPLIED AGREEMENT AS ALTERNATIVE
GROUNDS FOR AFFIRMING TEE GIFT DETERMINATION, THIS COURT
SHOULD REFUSE TO AFFIRM ON EITHER OF THESE GROUNDS.
In the event this Court reverses the judgment of the trial
court on the gift issue, Joel offers the theories of promissory
estoppel and implied agreement as alternative grounds for this
Court to affirm the trial court's judgment awarding one half of
the partnership assets to the Daughters and one half to Joel.
(Joel's Brief at 40.)

Joel did not argue either of these

theories at trial.7 Although the supreme court has held that an
appellate court may affirm on grounds not argued below, it
recently has noted that "our previous opinions on that question
have been somewhat inconsistent."

South,

924 P.2d at 355 n.3.

Similarly, this Court has refused to consider alternative grounds
for affirmance that were not argued before the trial court:.
Werner-Jacobs

en v.

Bednarik,

See

945 P. 2d 744, 748 (Utah Ct. App.

1997) .
Should this Court reach the merits of the alternative
7

Joel did argue that, in the event the trial court did not
find that a partnership existed, he should be compensated for the
reasonable value of his services under a contract implied in law
(guancum meruit). (R. 124-25.) As discussed below, however,
Joel's present argument: amouncs to a request for this Court to
find a contract implied in fact governing disposition of the
assets uoon dissolution of the partnership.
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grounds, however, affirmance on either of these grounds is
improper because the elements of these theories are not
"'apparent on the record.'"
(Utah Ct. App. 1997).

State

In Montoya,

v. Montoya,

937 P.2d 145, 149

this Court recognized that,

"[i]f, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time
on appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of
affirming on any proper ground has no application."
(emphasis in original).

Id.

"[T]he record must contain sufficient

and uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to
place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the
prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal."
(emphasis added).

Id.

at 149-50

Thus, for this Court to affirm on either of

the asserted grounds, the elements of promissory estoppel or
implied agreement must be apparent on the record and supported by
"sufficient and uncontroverted evidence."
A.

Id.

The Evidence Does Not Establish the Elements of
Promissory Estoppel.

The elements of promissory estoppel are as follows: (1) a
promise "'reasonably expected to induce reliance,'" (2)
reasonable reliance "'inducing action or forbearance on the part
of the promisee or a third person,'" and (3) detriment "'to the
promisee or third person.'"

Andreason

14

v.

Aezna

Cas.

& Sur.

Co.,

848 P.2d 171, 174-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted).
Because evidence supporting these elements is not apparent on the
record, this Court should reject Joel's arguments regarding
promissory estoppel.
!

T^O v.-viAen«o noes Not Reflect A Definite and
retain P ~ ™ ^ » >>v Fred that Joel's Labor Would Be
^ i „ ^ Equally with Fred's Money Contributiong.

Joel argues that Fred and Joel's "agreement" to build a
business out of money and labor is "essentially" a promise by
Fred that Joel's labor would receive equal treatment with Fred's
money.

(Joel's Brief at 41-42.)

The "promise" under promissory

estoppel, however, must be "sufficiently definite and certain
that the plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person
under the circumstances would be justified in placing reliance
thereon."
32 (1965).

Petty v. Gindy Mfg.

Corp.,

17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30,

Joel's argument that Fred "essentially" and

"implicitly" made a promise that labor equals money dispels the
conclusion that the alleged promise was sufficiently definite or
certain to induce reasonable reliance.

See

id.

Joel relies on his testimony that "the agreement" between he
and Fred was that "he was financing it and I was doing the work."
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(R. 282, pg. 85. ) 3

That testimony, however, reflects only an

agreement, made at some unidentified time, regarding the identity
of the contributions to be made by each partner.

It does not,

with sufficient certainty, reflect a promise by Fred that Joelfs
labor would be treated as equivalent to Fred's money
contributions.

See Petty,

Allied

Co.,

Develop.

404 P. 2d at 32; see also

Rose

v.

719 P.2d 83, 87 (Utah 1986) (discussing

prior decision in which court refused to imply a promise in
employment contract "to which the employer had not expressly
agreed" (emphasis added)).

Also, Joel does not explain how

Fred's "horror stories about lawyers" amounted to a promise that
Joel's labor would equal Fred's capital contributions.

Although

Joel argues that Fred led him to believe that his "ownershio
rights were secure," he identifies no specific promise that
"ownership rights" meant an equalization of labor and monev at
the time of dissolution of the partnership.

The evidence cited

Joel further relies on his "understanding" that Fred "was
supplying the money and some of the wisdom, and I was supolying
my youth and my ability to get things done." (R. 282, pg. 148.)
This testimony of Joel's subjective understanding, however, does
not establish Fred's assent to the terms of the promise alleged
by Joel.

See Rose

v.

Allied

Develop.

Co.,

719 P. 2d 83, 87 (Utah

198 6) (stating that promissory estoppel requires more than
"subjective understanding" of alleged promisee) .
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by Joel simply fails to establish the first element of promissory
estoppel.
2.

Joel Has Failed to Establish that the Alleged
Promise Induced Reasonable Reliance On His Part.

Even assuming that Fred made the promise as Joel alleges,
Joel cannot show reasonable reliance induced by the promise.
"'Damages in promissory estoppel are limited to those which are
sustained because the plaintiffs have changed their position to
their detriment in reasonable reliance upon the defendant's
representations. '" Andreason,

848 P.2d at 175-76 (emphasis

added) (citation omitted).
As noted above, Joel does not identify when Fred allegedly
promised him that Joel's labor would equal Fred's money
contributions.

(R. 282, pgs. 73-74, 85, 148.)

On these grounds

alone, Joel has failed to establish that Fred's alleged promise
induced him to detrimentally rely on the promise. Also, even if
Fred's comments about attorneys could somehow be construed as a
promise to Joel that his labor equaled Fred's money, Joel's
testimony that "I was really very dumb not: to go hire an
attorney" confirms his own belief than reliance on the alleged
promise was not: reasonable.

{Id.

a: 102.)

Joel himself admitted

that he really "wasn't locking for legal advice."

{Id.)

The record further establishes that it was Joel who bought
the first cow and that Joel asked Fred whether he would like to
"get into it."

{Id.

at 9.)

Finally, Joel cannot argue that

Fred's ambiguous statement not to "worry" about his kids caused
Joel to incur injury.

{Id.

at 55-56.)

The record establishes

only that this conversation took place "[a]fter the land was
purchased."

{Id.)

The record is unclear whether the

conversation took place before Joel expended the efforts he now
claims were induced by reliance on Fred's alleged promise.
Because, on the record before the trial court, Joel cannot
establish reasonable reliance that resulted from a clear promise
made by Fred that labor would be treated equally with money, this
Court should reject Joel!s arguments regarding promissory
estoppel.
B.

The Record Contains No Grounds To Affirm the "Gift"
Determination on the Basis of An Implied Contract
Overcoming the Presumptions of the Uniform Partnership
Act,

Joel argues that this Court may affirm the trial court's
determination regarding disposition of assets on the basis of an
implied contract between Fred and Joel that altered the statutory
presumptions set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1998).
cites Petersen v. Petersen,

Joel

169 N.W.2d 228 (Minn. 1969), in which
18

the trial court found an implied agreement between partners that,
upon dissolution, each was entitled to receive one half of the
assets and profits. See id.

at 230. The court noted that,

although such agreements need not be in writing, they must be
established by reference to the law governing contracts implied
in fact.

See

id.

In Utah, " [a] contract is express or implied by reason of
the expression of offer and acceptance, -- whether there is a
manifestation of mutual assent, by words or actions or both,
which reasonably are interpretable as indicating an intention to
make a bargain with certain terms or terms which reasonably may
be made certain."

Rasmussen

v.

United

States

Steel

Co.,

i Utah

2d 291, 265 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (1954) (emphasis added) . The supreme
court has rejected a finding of implied contract when there was
"no evidence of any action or conduct that reasonably could be
construed as a manifestation of mutual assenc indicating an
intention to be bound on a contract whose terms were certain."
Fowler

v. Taylor,

554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 1976).9

9

More recent Utah decisions on contracts implied in fact
set forth three necessary elements: "(I) the defendant requested
the plaintiff to perform work; (2) the plaintiff expected the
defendant to compensate him or her for those services; and (3)
the defendant knew or should have known that the plaintiff
19

Joel argues that the "record unequivocally demonstrates"
that his labor would be equal to Fredfs money.
43.)

(Joel's Brief at

Without record support, Joel makes the assertion that

"[w]hatever they gave was immediately equal."

(Id.)

To the

contrary, however, Joel cites no evidence in the record showing
Fred's assent "indicating an intention to be bound on a contract"
containing the "certain" term that all assets and profits were to
be divided equally upon dissolution of the partnership.
554 P.2d at 208.

Fowler,

Because Fred's assent to a binding contract on

the terms alleged by Joel is not "apparent on the record," this'
Court should reject Joel's arguments.

Montoya,

937 P.2d at 149.

In view of the standard applied to the determination of
implied contracts, the cases cited by Joel are unhelpful.
Kuhl v. Gardner,

In

894 P.2d 525 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), the defendant

did not dispute that the plaintiffs were entitled to one half of
the partnership assets and profits.

See id.

at 532.

Only the

timing and conditions of the distribution were at issue.
In Citizens

Bank of Clovis

v. Williams,

See

id.

630 P. 2d 1228 (N.M.

expected compensation." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987). To the extent that this test applies here, Joel
does not argue that the record supports a finding of chese
elements.
20

1981), the trial court found a valid "oral" agreement, unlike the
alleged implied agreement here, that all assets were to be
divided equally upon dissolution.

Id.

at 1229.

Neither of the

cases analyzed the "agreement" in the light of principles similar
to those governing implied contracts under Utah law.

The cases

and the evidence on the record simply do not support a
determination that Fred and Joel entered into a binding contract
sufficient to rebut the presumption, set forth in section 48-137, that Fred was entitled to a return of his capital
contributions.

For these reasons, this Court should refuse to

affirm the trial court's judgment on grounds of an implied
contract.
IV.

BECAUSE JOEL HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH TEAT THE TRIAL COURT
CLEARLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT JOEL'S LABOR WAS NOT A CAPITAL
CONTRIBUTION, THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT JOEL'S REQUEST TO
AFFIRM ON THESE GROUNDS.
Joel has cross-appealed the trial court's finding that

Joel's labor did not constitute a capital contribution.
Brief at 47.)

(Joel's

Joel asks this Court to address the cross-acpealed

issue, however, only if the Court reverses on the gift issue.
(Id.)

Thus, Joel does not seek to enlarge the rights aranced to

him by the trial court, see

South,

924 P. 2d at 355-56, but

asserts the cross-appealed issue only to preserve the result
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obtained at trial.

For the reasons set forth below, Joel has

failed to carry his burden on appeal to show the error of the
trial court's finding.
A.

Joel Has Failed to Marshal the Evidence
Supporting the Trial Court's Determination
That Joel and Fred Did Not Agree to Treat
Joel's Labor As a Capital Contribution.

Joel asserts that, because the trial court's decision on
this point "came from reading the case law cited" by the parties,
the trial court's decision is purely a question of law requiring
no marshaling of the evidence.

(Joel's Brief at 48.)

To the

contrary, the trial court stated that "[i]n this situation I
think both of them participated in the partnership, as should
most partners.

That should be the participation.

However as I

have considered the case, I now find that the labor of Joel did
not constitute a capital contribution."

(R. 282, pgs. 204-05.)

(Emphasis added.)
Indeed, the very cases relied upon by Joel state that the
determination of whether an agreement exists to treat labor as
capital is a finding of fact.

See Schymanski

v. Conventz,

674

P. 2d 281, 285 (Alaska 1983) (remanding for "additional findings"
on whether partners agreed to treat personal services as a
capital contribution) . The only principle of law stated in the
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cases considered by the trial court is that, absent an agreement
to the contrary, the labor or personal services of a partner is
not a capital contribution.

See,

e.g.,

id.

Thus, in rejecting

Joel's arguments, the trial court implicitly "found" that Fred
and Joel did not agree to treat Joel's labor as capital.
Mower v.

McCarthy,

See

122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224, 227 (1952) (" [W] e

assume that the trial court found the facts in accord with its
decision in all cases where under the evidence it could
reasonably so find.").

The trial court's label of this

determination as a "conclusion of law" is not binding on this
Court.

See

Gillmor

v.

Wright,

850 P.2d 431, 453 (Utah 1993)

("On

appeal, we disregard the labels attached to findings and
conclusions and look to the substance.").
Under these circumstances, Joel was required to marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's finding and show that, even
when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court, the
evidence is insufficient to support the finding.
Allen

Co.

v.

Kurzet,

See

Bailey-

945 P.2d 180, 186 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

Because Joel makes no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting
the trial court's finding that Joel and Fred did not agree to
treat labor as a capital contribution, this Court should refuse
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to consider the merits of his cross-appeal.
B.

Even On The Merits, Joel's Cross-Appeal Should Be
Rejected Because The Record Reflects Neither An
Agreement That Joel's Labor Would Be Treated As a
Capital Contribution Nor An Undisputed Value of Joel's
Services.

Should this Court proceed to the merits on this issue,
however, Joel's arguments fail because the record does not
support the existence of an agreement to treat Joel's labor as a
capital contribution.

Joel's actions in failing to keep records

of time worked or demanding wages, however, do not reflect his or
Fred's understanding that Joel was to receive capital credit for
services rendered to the partnership.

(R. 282, pg. 55.)

Significantly, the trial court made no findings regarding the
value of Joel's services and the Daughters questioned the
accuracy of Joel's "estimate" on the value.

(Id.

at 70-75.)10

In view of the lack of evidence supporting the existence of an
agreement to treat labor as a capital contribution, and the

10

The case law cited by Joel is distinguishable. In
Eardley v. Salmons, 8 Utah 2d 159, 330 P.2d 122 (1958), the
partners clearly provided that the defendant was to receive a
certain amount as wages for services rendered to the partnership.
Id. at 123. In Farris v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 222
F.2d 320, 322 (10th Cir. 1955), the parties had prepared a
written partnership agreement that clearly set forth the value of
the partner's personal services and contemplated the treatment of
labor as a capital contribution.
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existence of conflicting evidence on the value of Joel's
services, this Court should refuse to affirm the judgment on the
alternative grounds that Joel's labor was a capital contribution.
See Montoya,

937 P.2d at 149.
CONCLUSION

The Daughters respectfully request that this Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court determining that Fred and Joel
entered into a partnership.

In the alternative, the Daughters

request reversal of the judgment on grounds that the ranch
property was not a partnership asset.

Finally, even assuming

that Fred and Joel entered into a partnership that included the
property, this Court should reverse the judgment on grounds that
Fred did not make a legally valid gift to Joel of one half of his
capital contributions.

The case should then be remanded with

instructions to award to the Daughters the full value of Fred's
capital contributions.
DATED this 10th day of December 1998.
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Counsel for Appellants/CrossAppellees
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